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Abstract
Reduction of compound lotteries is implicit both in the statement of the St. Petersburg Paradox and in its resolu-
tion by Expected Utility (EU). We report three real-money choice experiments between truncated compound-form
St. Petersburg gambles and their reduced-form equivalents. The first tests for differences in elicited Certainty
Equivalents. The second develops the distinction between ‘weak-form’ and ‘strong-form’ rejection of Reduction,
as well as a novel experimental task that verifiably implements Vernon Smith’s dominance precept. The third
experiment checks for robustness against range and increment manipulation. In all three experiments the null
hypothesis of Reduction is rejected, with systematic deprecation of the compound form in favor of the reduced
form. This is consistent with the predictions of alternation bias. Together these experiments offer evidence that
the Reduction assumption may have limited descriptive validity in modelling St. Petersburg gambles, whether by
EU or non-EU theories.
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1 Introduction
Throughout its 300-year existence,1 the St. Petersburg Paradox has hinged on an implicit as-
sumption that has become so deeply imbedded in the mathematics and economics professions
that it is commonly deployed without any perceived need for separate justification. The as-
sumption is that, for the purpose of modeling choice, compound lotteries may be reduced to
their probabilistically equivalent simple lotteries “whose prizes are all the possible prizes of
the compound lottery ticket, each evaluated with the compound probabilities that the classical
algebra of probability defines” (Samuelson, 1952, p. 671). Within the program to formalize
Expected Utility (EU), this assumption was made explicit and instated as an axiom of rational
preferences: the Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom,2 by which rational decision makers
are required to be indifferent between a multi-stage compound lottery and its probabilistically
equivalent ‘collapsed’ single-stage simple lottery.
Reduction is implicit both in the statement of the St. Petersburg Paradox as well as in its
accepted resolution. The statement of the paradox hinges on powers i in the payoff function,





, for all i∈Z++, yielding an infinite sum. Daniel Bernoulli’s resolution, just as the modern
resolution by EU, also implements Reduction3 in specifying the probability of heads on the ith






Nevertheless the experimental literature on probability perception suggests that alterna-
tion bias – a subjective distortion of conditional probability in binary sequences – should be
empirically relevant for St. Petersburg Gamble (StPG) coin-toss sequences. Indeed specifically
coin-toss sequences have been investigated in many ‘perception of randomness’ experiments (e.g.
Rapoport and Budescu, 1997; Kareev, 1995; Budescu, 1987; for a review see Bar-Hillel and Wa-
genaar, 1991). Purely from a theoretical standpoint, augmentation of mathematical expectation
with alternation bias is sufficient by itself to ensure that Willingness To Pay (WTP) for the
StPG is finite and within the generally accepted empirical range (Kaivanto, 2008). Moreover,
insofar as alternation bias is manifest as the subjective attribution of negative autocorrelation
to objectively memoryless and unbiased Bernoulli processes, it suggests that Reduction may not
1Nicolaus Bernoulli posed the problem in a letter to Reimond de Montmort on September 9, 1713. Daniel
Bernoulli’s solution, precursor to the modern economics of decision making under risk, was published in the 1738
Memoirs of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, for which reason it has come to be known as the
St. Petersburg Paradox.
2von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) refer to it as Axiom 3:C:b (p. 26).
3implicit in the former, explicit in the latter
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hold empirically for StPGs.
The present paper addresses the as-yet untested empirical question, Is Reduction violated in
StPGs? The experimental design developed for this purpose incorporates several innovations.
First, as is pertinent given the emphasis on sequential effects, the lotteries in this experiment
are truncated real-money StPGs.4 Second, we introduce reduced-form truncated StPGs, which
are implemented with a single draw from an Urn. And third, we introduce a new choice list
instrument. By design, this instrument permits simultaneous investigation of (i) weak-form
violation of Reduction and (ii) strong-form violation of Reduction, while (iii) providing a gauge
of subject-level heterogeneity in task-engagement cost5 and treatment effect magnitude, and (iv)
satisfying the dominance precept of value inducement in the presence of this heterogeneity.
In total we report three real-money experiments in which the standard compound-lottery
form of the (truncated) StPG is explicitly juxtaposed with its reduced form. The former is im-
plemented with a coin toss sequence consistent with convention, while the latter is implemented
with a single random draw from a probabilistically equivalent urn. In the first experiment, we
elicit subjects’ certainty (cash) equivalents for each form of the gamble. In the second exper-
iment, subjects face a choice list consisting of 11 choice tasks between the compound and the
reduced form of the gamble, where each choice task has a distinct bonus payment added to one
of the alternatives. The list starts with e5 added to the reduced form (Urn) and ends with e5
added to the compound form (Coin), changing in increments of e1 between choice tasks. This
configuration offers a test of ‘strong-form’ violation of Reduction, in which subjects reveal with
real-money choices whether they violate Reduction, and if so, how much they explicitly forgo in
doing so. In the third experiment, we investigate possible range and increment effects with an
11-item price list that ranges from e1 added to the reduced form to e1 added to the compound
form, changing in increments of 20 Euro cents between choice tasks.
In the first experiment we find that the distribution of certainty equivalents for the reduced
form stochastically dominates the distribution of certainty equivalents for the compound form.
Within subjects, the reduced form’s certainty equivalent is statistically significantly larger than
that of the objectively identical reduced form. Therefore we conclude that Reduction is violated
in this ‘judged valuation’ task, revealing a bias toward the reduced form. This bias is borne out
4Previous experiments – e.g. by Cox et al. (2009) – have employed finite but not truncated StPGs. However,
one of the finite St. Petersburg Gambles in Michael Birnbaum’s (1998) yet-to-be published manuscript qualifies
as truncated in the proper sense.
5meaning δ, the monetary equivalent value of the subjective cost of supplying the null hypothesis response
instead of the alternative hypothesis response
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in the second experiment. When choice is costless – i.e. in a straight choice between the reduced
form and the compound form – 90% of the subjects choose the reduced form over the compound
form. This constitutes a weak-form violation of Reduction in which the null hypothesis is
premised on strict adherence to the axioms of EU and thus the absence of ‘secondary criteria’
influencing choice. Furthermore, 47.5% of the subjects forgo a sure e1 added to the compound
form in order to obtain the reduced form.6 These 47.5% violate Reduction in the strong-form
sense, whereby a distinct preference for the reduced form is expressed through choice which
involves giving up a certain e1. In the third experiment, a full 100% choose the reduced
form over the compound form when it is objectively costless to do so (weak-form violation of
Reduction), and 87.5% choose to forgo 20 Euro cents to obtain the reduced form rather than
the objectively equivalent compound form (strong-form violation of Reduction).
In each of these experiments, both the rejection of the EU-based null hypothesis as well as
the direction of this departure are consistent with the operation of alternation bias. This is a
distortion of conditional probability, distinct from distortion of outcomes7 and distortion of un-
conditional probabilities.8 By design, the present experiments preclude the possibility that the
observed choice behavior may be due to distortion of outcomes (concavity of utility) or distor-
tion of unconditional probabilities (e.g. probability weighting). Altogether, these experiments
provide evidence that the Reduction assumption (Axiom) may have limited descriptive validity
in St. Petersburg Gambles. These results carry implications for both the demonstration of the
St. Petersburg Paradox as well as for its theoretical resolution, each of which invokes Reduction
without separate justification.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Reduction is presented in Section 2 both from
a theoretical and empirical standpoint. Alternation bias is presented in Section 3. The concepts
of weak-form and strong-form violation of Reduction are developed in Section 4. Section 5 on
materials and methods presents the new constructs developed for this investigation: truncated
StPGs, reduced-form StPGs, and a multiple-price list for implementing weak- and strong-form
(dominance satisfying) tests of Reduction. Experiments I, II and III are presented in Sections 6,
7 and 8. Further analysis of alternation bias is presented in Section 9, and Section 10 discusses
the results obtained here in light of previous studies. Section 11 concludes.
6Conversely, none of the subjects is willing to forgo a sure e1 added to the reduced form in order to obtain
the compound form.
7Bernoulli’s ‘moral worth’ and concave utility of money
8Yaari’s dual theory and Prospect Theory’s probability weighting
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2 Reduction of compound lotteries
EU incorporates Reduction of compound lotteries, sometimes stated as an assumption, some-
times as an axiom. Some formalizations stipulate that simple one-stage lotteries are the basic
objects of choice to which theory applies, and that multi-stage compound lotteries are ‘reduced’
into such simple lotteries through algebra alone (Samuelson, 1952; Hauser, 1978). Other for-
malizations require the decision maker to be indifferent between a multi-stage compound lottery
and its probabilistically equivalent simple one-stage lottery (e.g. Harrison et al., 2012). von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) denote it as Axiom 3:C:b and describe it as an expression of
the ‘algebra of combining’ (p. 26). In parts of the EU literature the axiom is known by this
latter label (Aumann, 1962; Fishburn, 1978). Luce and Raiffa (1957) instead invoke it as an
assumption rather than as an axiom (Assumption 2, p. 26).
The Prospect Theory literature has adopted a variety of different approaches for dealing
with compound prospects. Prospect Theory as originally introduced simply excluded com-
pound prospects from consideration by restricting the domain of representable preferences to
simple prospects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In an exploratory investigation by the same
authors, Reduction was found to be violated by the certainty effect and the pseudo-certainty
effect, focusing attention on the second-stage prospect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The
‘cumulative’ variant of Prospect Theory also restricts the domain of representable preferences
to simple prospects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). There are several approaches to accommo-
dating multi-stage lotteries, each with its own drawbacks (Wakker, 2010, Appendix C).
The normative appeal of Reduction notwithstanding, from a descriptive standpoint Reduc-
tion is a very strong assumption. Hauser (1978) expresses the view that it is “perhaps the
strongest assumption in the utility axioms.” Fishburn (1978) notes that “...many people exhibit
systematic and persistent violations of... ...the reduction or invariance principle which says that
preference or choice between acts depends only on their separate probability distributions over
outcomes” (p. 492).9
Numerous experimental studies have investigated various aspects of Reduction (Bar-Hillel,
1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Keller, 1985; Bernasconi and Loomes, 1992; Gneezy, 1996;
Budescu and Fischer, 2001; Halevy, 2007). Recently, Kaivanto and Kroll (2012) found weak-
form violation of Reduction in real-money choices between probabilistically equivalent com-
9emphasis added
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pound (two-stage) and simple (single-stage) lotteries offering a 1-in-10 chance of e100 ($136).
The Kaivanto and Kroll (2012) experiment, which includes control treatments for ratio bias
and computational limitations, finds that 80% of subjects choose the reduced form over the
compound form, thereby violating the Reduction Axiom in the weak-form sense. Nevertheless,
according to the most recent study of Reduction by Harrison et al. (2012), such violations of
Reduction should be mere artifacts of the Random Lottery Incentive (RLI) scheme, in which a
number of questions are asked, but only one randomly selected question is ‘played out and paid
out’ for real money.10 Harrison et al. (2012) find that violation of Reduction disappears when
each question is individually ‘played out and paid out’ for real money. However, Kaivanto and
Kroll (2012) find substantial weak-form violation of Reduction in choice between single-stage
reduced-form and two-stage compound-form ( 110 , e100) lotteries, even though they too ‘play
out and pay out’ each question individually.
3 Alternation bias
Alternation bias is a binary sequence manifestation of the local representativeness effect, whereby
the population (or infinite limit) properties of a stochastic process are attributed, erroneously,
to small finite samples. The local representativeness effect was introduced into the economics
literature by Rabin (2002) as a psychological law of small numbers, whereby people misjudge
and “exaggerate how likely it is that a small sample resembles the parent population from which
it is drawn” (p. 775).
For finite Bernoulli sequences generated by an objectively fair and memoryless coin, the
local representativeness effect leads a subject to expect, within finite sequences, (i) close to a
50%–50% balance between Heads and Tails, and (ii) excessive local irregularity, i.e. too many
reversals between Heads and Tails. It is this latter subjective predisposition to expect too many
reversals that we call alternation bias. This may be understood more formally as a negatively
distorted conditional subjective probability belief, or alternatively as an alternation rate that is
subjectively upward-distorted PS(H|T ) = PS(T |H) > 0.5.
Alternation bias was first hypothesized by Reichenbach (1934), and it has been amply docu-
mented and replicated in the ‘perception of randomness’ experimental literature (see summary
in Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991). Experimental studies place the magnitude of first-order
10(Grether and Plott, 1979; Starmer and Sugden, 1994; Cubitt et al., 1998)
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alternation bias at PS(H|T ) = PS(T |H) = 0.6 (Budescu, 1987; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991;
Kareev, 1995). This forms a lower bound, as alternation bias effects have been estimated up to
sixth order (Budescu, 1987). Within economics there are multiple studies, using both observa-
tional and laboratory data, that substantiate and replicate local representativeness, alternation
bias and their manifestations the Gambler’s Fallacy and the Hot Hand effect (Asparouhava et
al., 2009; Clotfelter and Cook, 1993; Terrell, 1994, 1998; Croson and Sundali, 2005).
Alternation bias holds clear implications for preferences between compound lotteries and
their probabilistically equivalent reduced-form lotteries. Ceteris paribus, subjects whose per-
ception of randomness is characterized by alternation bias will not be indifferent between the
compound form of a lottery (where alternation bias is operative) and its reduced-form equiv-
alent (where there is no sequential structure to trigger alternation bias). In other words, the
indifference between reduced- and compound-form lottery variants stipulated by Reduction is
predicted to be violated under alternation bias.
Moreover, specifically for StPGs, alternation bias carries implications for mathematical ex-
pectation embodying this subjective distortion.11 Let n˜ ∈ Z++ be the (random) index of the
first toss on which a fair coin first turns up ‘Heads’. As n˜ is characterized by the geometric dis-






Based on first-order alternation bias alone, PS(H|T ) = 0.6 and PS(T |T ) = 0.4, so the subjective






2 for n = 1
1
2PS(H|T )PS(T |T )
n−2 = 0.3 · 0.4n−2 for n ≥ 2
(3.1)
giving a subjectively distorted mathematical expectation of




n = 7.0 (3.2)
without any need to invoke risk aversion or unconditional probability weighting.
4 Hypothesis development: weak-form and strong-form violation
For the purpose of formal testing, the Reduction assumption taken in isolation is insufficient for
deriving a null hypothesis concerning choice behavior.12 Reduction may only be tested as part
11First pointed out in Kaivanto (2008).
12Additional assumptions, such as completeness and monotonicity, are required.
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of a joint hypothesis, ideally derived from an axiomatic theory of choice. In the present context,
the natural candidate is EU, which as generally understood incorporates Reduction as an axiom
or an assumption, and constitutes the modern counterpart to Daniel Bernoulli’s ‘moral worth’
solution of the St. Petersburg Paradox.
The Reduction Axiom of EU stipulates that compound lotteries are evaluated as their equiv-
alent single-stage reduced forms, and thus that indifference holds between compound lotteries
and their reduced-form simple-lottery counterparts. However EU does not provide explicit guid-
ance for choice when indifference holds. Any choice from among lotteries judged indifferent is
consistent with EU.13 Where indifference holds between two lotteries, the decision maker loses
no utility regardless of which lottery she chooses; choice is ‘costless’.
Nevertheless it is not the case that EU places no restrictions on choice between lotteries for
which the indifference relation holds. EU restricts attention to lottery payoffs and probabilities.
Under EU, no other characteristics are admitted as being choice-relevant. Moreover, under
the Reduction Axiom, the only attributes to be legitimately (rationally) consulted in making a
choice are the probabilities and payoffs of the reduced-form, single-stage, simple lottery. Under
EU, preference is blind to all distinctions14 between the compound form and its probabilistically
equivalent reduced form.
This extends even to the difference in ‘complexity’ between compound and reduced forms.15
Hence augmentation of EU with a further lexicographic criterion – albeit potentially an intu-
itively appealing rationalization of any revealed bias toward the reduced form – is in fact formally
incompatible with the theoretical formulation of EU. In view of this strict and pure theoretical
interpretation, lexicographic biasing of choice toward either the reduced form or the compound
form would constitute a violation of EU.16 Such lexicographic biasing of choice cannot be de-
tected with a single observation per subject, but can in principle be detected with repeated
observations or in the sample average of single-choice observations. Given the stringency of the
13As an example, note that Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exploits this property.
14including e.g. complexity, the presence or absence of compoundness, the number of levels of compounding,
simultaneous vs. sequential resolution of uncertainty, and the uniformity vs. non-uniformity of the time spacing
of the resolution of uncertainty
15For the effect of complexity, see Sonsino et al. (2002) and Sonsino (2011).
16Apparent preference reversals (Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Butler and Loomes, 2007; Blavatskyy, 2009; Bardsley
et al., 2010, Ch. 7) and apparent violations of betweenness (Blavatskyy, 2006) result from the differential impact
of a zero-mean error term across two choice tasks. Either a constant-variance error term has a bigger impact on
one choice task because the alternatives are ‘closer together’, or for other reasons – differential complexity being
one possible example – the variance of the error term is larger in one choice task than in the other. However the
test for weak-form violation of Reduction discussed here involves only a single choice task. Hence zero-mean error
cannot result in a systematically biased choice pattern.
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theoretical assumptions being maintained, however, we refer to this as a weak-form violation of
Reduction. Null hypotheses for tests of weak-form violation of Reduction stipulate symmetrical
empirical choice frequencies for compound-form and reduced-form lotteries.17
Following Vernon Smith’s precepts for valid microeconomic experiments (induced value the-
ory), we must nevertheless recognize that subjects face numerous costs in supplying the null
hypothesis response instead of the alternative hypothesis response (Marschak, 1968; Smith,
1982; Wilcox, 1993; Harrison, 1994). These costs, the aggregate of which we denote with the
symbol δ, include the cost of cognitive effort, concentration, fighting distraction or boredom,
and the effect of other components of the subject’s utility that are higher under the alternative
hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. Moreover, specifically when a subject is indiffer-
ent between alternatives, “secondary criteria may be quite important and apparently small or
seemingly irrelevant changes to the framing of decisions (e.g. positioning of words) may have
a marked effect” (italics added, Bernasconi and Loomes, 1992). To overcome these costs and
secondary criteria, the dominance precept requires that “the rewards corresponding to the null
hypothesis are perceptively and motivationally greater [by at least δ > 0] than the rewards
corresponding to the alternative hypothesis” in order to “overcome any costs (e.g. the psychic
cost of effort or of concentration) or components of the subject’s utility that might induce a
response that is not in accordance with the null hypothesis” (Harrison, 1994).
As observed by Chernoff (1954), Savage (1954), Bernasconi and Loomes (1992), Mandler
(2005) and Danan (2008), EU in fact offers a crisp prediction when a sure bonus18 x ∈ R++
is added to one of the lotteries. Due to the monotonicity axiom of EU, such a sure bonus x,
no matter how small, causes the indifference relation to be replaced by strict preference for the
bonus-augmented lottery. Hence adding a small bonus x to either the compound form or the
reduced form causes EU decision makers to choose the bonus-augmented option. The formal
experimental design property of dominance is satisfied when x > δ. But as the value of δ is
unknown and subject-specific, a range of values of x may be employed. Where larger values
of x lead to lower rates of deviation from the EU prediction – both where x augments the
compound-form lottery and where x augments the reduced-form lottery – an associated weak-
17To our knowledge this is the first time that the logic of the ‘50%–50% randomization’ null hypothesis has
been spelled out. The assumptions involved – strict adherence to an axiomatic theory that leaves no room for
secondary criteria or for δ > 0 – are implausibly strong. Nevertheless this null hypothesis often crops up in the
literature.
18called a ‘small monetary perturbation’ by Savage (1954)
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form violation of Reduction based on costless choice19 may be ascribed to the failure to satisfy
dominance. However, if choice is EU consistent in all bonus-augmented reduced-form (Urn+x)
questions, an inference concerning δ is possible. Namely, it may be inferred that δ < minx.
This is particularly helpful in interpreting EU inconsistent bonus-augmented compound-form
(Coin+x) questions, as δ < minx now ensures that the failure to choose in accordance with
the EU-derived null hypothesis is not attributable to absence of dominance, but strong-form
violation of Reduction. With δ < minx pinned down, larger values of x in Coin+x no longer
offset larger subject-specific values of δ, but instead offset the effects of more extreme degrees
of alternation bias.20
5 Materials and methods
Truncated StPGs The experiments reported here employ truncated StPGs. Cox et al. (2009),
for instance, employ finite StPGs that pay nothing in the event of all coin tosses in the sequence
landing ‘Tails’. Since, in the unrestricted StPG, the player’s payoff increases the longer the run
of Tails, it is important to recognize that if the ith toss lands Tails, extending a run of i−1
Tails by one, the player is entitled to a minimum payout of e2i+1. We employ StPGs that are
truncated at k={2, 6} tosses. In the k=2 case a run of 2 Tails pays off e23, while in the k=6
case a run of 6 Tails pays off e27. Thus the StPGs employed here are truncations in a formal
and proper sense.
Reduced-form StPGs Denote the ‘probability of landing Heads for the first time on toss
n’ in an StPG truncated to k tosses (n ≤ k) as pn(k). The vector of probabilities of landing
Heads for the first time on toss n = (1, 2, ..., k) then becomes p(k) = (p1(k), p2(k), ..., pk(k)). Thus
the probabilities of the k+1 possible payoffs (21, 22, ..., 2k, 2k+1) in the k-truncated StPG(k) may
be written as p(k,1) = (p1(k), p2(k), ..., pk(k), pk+1(k)). Therefore the k = 6 truncated StPG(6) is






















64 , so the k=6 reduced-form StPG(6) may be implemented with an urn containing 2
6=64 balls.
In general the k-truncated StPG(k) may be implemented with an urn containing no fewer than
2k balls.
19x=0 < δ
20i.e. larger PS(H |T )
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Table 1: Example multiple-price list with △=1
Q. Alternative A Alternative B
1. Urn variant + 5 Euro Coin variant
2. Urn variant + 4 Euro Coin variant
3. Urn variant + 3 Euro Coin variant
4. Urn variant + 2 Euro Coin variant
5. Urn variant + 1 Euro Coin variant
6. Urn variant Coin variant
7. Urn variant Coin variant + 1 Euro
8. Urn variant Coin variant + 2 Euro
9. Urn variant Coin variant + 3 Euro
10. Urn variant Coin variant + 4 Euro
11. Urn variant Coin variant + 5 Euro
Multiple-price list The multiple-price list developed here subsumes a ‘costless choice’ weak-
form violation of Reduction test and five incrementally more costly strong-form violation-of-
Reduction tests, which do double duty in recording across-subjects heterogeneity in δ and in
alternation bias strength corresponding to the magnitude of PS(H|T ).
The range of the multiple-price list is a function of the number of items (questions) and the
increment size. The number of items may be further decomposed into j ∈ Z++ items on either
side of the central ‘costless choice’ item, giving a total of 2j+1 items. Defining the inter-item
increment to be △ ∈ R++, then the total range of the choice list becomes 2j△.
Across all experiments and treatments reported here, we fix j =5, giving 11 items in total
(see Table 1). In Experiment II we employ an increment size of e1, giving a total range of
2 · 5 · 1 = e10. In Experiment III we employ △= 0.20 Euro, giving a total range of 2 · 5 · 0.20 =
e2.
Under the null hypothesis of Reduction (embedded in EU) combined with negligible δ, choice
in Q1–Q5 and Q7–Q11 is determined entirely by the bonus. If violation of Reduction is merely
apparent, due to a failure to satisfy the dominance precept, then a symmetrical pattern of
deviation may be expected around the costless choice item Q6. From this symmetrical pattern
one may infer the sample heterogeneity in δ. If however violation of Reduction is not merely
artifactual, then an asymmetric pattern around the costless choice item Q6 may be expected.
From one side of Q6 the upper bound of δ may be inferred, while from the other side of Q6 one
may infer sample heterogeneity in treatment effect size.
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Table 2: Zero computation cost presentation format of the StPG(6) Alternative A.
Urn variant
Ball no. Probability Payoff
1− 32 1/2 2 Euro
33− 48 1/4 4 Euro
49− 56 1/8 8 Euro
57− 60 1/16 16 Euro
61− 62 1/32 32 Euro
63 1/64 64 Euro
64 1/64 128 Euro
Coin variant
‘Heads’ on Probability Payoff
1st toss 1/2 2 Euro
2nd toss 1/4 4 Euro
3rd toss 1/8 8 Euro
4th toss 1/16 16 Euro
5th toss 1/32 32 Euro
6th toss 1/64 64 Euro
All ‘Tails’ 1/64 128 Euro
6 Experiment I
This experiment is designed to elicit subjects’ judged valuations of compound- and reduced-form
StPGs. We implement standard Certainty Equivalent elicitation for both forms of the StPG.
If Reduction holds, the StPGs, whether in compound form or reduced form, should be valued
identically.
6.1 subjects and procedures
The experiment was conducted at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). We recruited 73
students from the KIT engineering and computer science degree programs and assigned them to
sessions of no more than 10 subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject had already
completed at least one course in mathematics and statistics as part of his/her degree program.
subjects ranged in age from 20 to 25, with an average of 22.3 years. 68% of the subjects were
male, comparable to the KIT student population average.
Each subject was presented with two banks of 15 choices between Alternative A – the ‘coin
variant’ compound-form StPG(6) in one bank, the ‘urn variant’ reduced-form StPG(6) in the
other bank – and Alternative B (a sure payoff). Within each bank the sure payoff ranged from
e1 to e15 in increments of e1 between questions (see Table 3). Each choice (i.e. question) was
presented individually. To pre-empt response heterogeneity arising from individual differences in
short-term memory and computation costs21, a complete description of Alternative A – including
a complete enumeration of the possible events, their probabilities, and associated payoffs – was
provided on each question screen (see Table 2).
21resulting in e.g. miscalculation of compound probabilities
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Despite being presented individually (and not in list form on a single screen), the e1 to e15
range can conceivably serve to prime or anchor subjects’ responses. However as we are interested
in the difference between the Certainty Equivalents of the compound and reduced forms – and
not the levels per se – then even if there were a priming or anchoring effect, our results should
remain unbiased because this e1 to e15 range is present in both compound-form and reduced-
form ‘banks’. These choice tasks were computer-administered with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
as part of a larger experiment (103 questions in total). At the end of the experiment, a single
question was randomly selected (out of the 103 questions) for each individual, to be ‘played out
an payed out’ for real money (RLI mechanism).
At the beginning of each session, the subjects received written instructions describing the
general types of questions they would face during the experiment as well as a detailed expla-
nation of the RLI mechanism. After all session participants had read the instructions and
explanations, the experimenter demonstrated the Urn and Coin Toss randomization devices to
be used. In advance of commencing on the two banks of questions in z-Tree, subjects were given
the opportunity to seek clarification on any aspect of the experiment. subjects wishing to ask
a question were individually led outside of the laboratory, where neither the question nor the
answer could be heard by the remaining session subjects. After all subjects completed their
choice tasks, the experimenter proceeded to implement the RLI payoff scheme for each subject
individually. Standard laboratory protocols to minimize the risk of experimenter demand effects
were followed, as were measures to preclude individuals from illusion of control and deriving
utility from direct personal involvement in ‘playing out’ the RLI.
6.2 Results
59 subjects switch exactly once from choosing the lottery to choosing the sure payoff in both
15-question sequences. We refer to the first sure payoff that the subject chooses as the subject’s
‘Certainty Equivalent’ for that lottery.22 4 subjects choose the lottery in all 15 tasks. Con-
sequently their Certainty Equivalents can not be determined with finite precision but only as
falling ‘above e15’. We code these subjects’ Certainty Equivalents as e16 and use the median
for the purpose of comparing treatments (N= 63).
subjects judge the value of the reduced-form StPG to be higher: the median Certainty
22The certain money sum that yields an indifference relation with the lottery will be less than or equal to this
integer, but strictly larger than the next-smaller integer. Here we are interested in the difference between the
reduced-form and the compound-form lotteries, rather than the levels of the Certainty Equivalents themselves.
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Table 3: Fifteen choices (presented individually, not all at once) between the lottery (Alternative
A: either the reduced-form Urn-implemented StPG(6) or the compound-form Coin-implemented
StPG(6)) and a fixed sure amount (Alternative B).
Q. Alternative A Alternative B: certain sum
1. Lottery 1 Euro
2. Lottery 2 Euro
3. Lottery 3 Euro
4. Lottery 4 Euro
5. Lottery 5 Euro
6. Lottery 6 Euro
7. Lottery 7 Euro
8. Lottery 8 Euro
9. Lottery 9 Euro
10. Lottery 10 Euro
11. Lottery 11 Euro
12. Lottery 12 Euro
13. Lottery 13 Euro
14. Lottery 14 Euro
15. Lottery 15 Euro
Equivalent for the reduced-form StPG is e8, while it is e6 for the compound-form StPG.
Note that the mathematical expectation of StPG(6) is e8, while the first-order alternation bias
that rationalizes a subjectively distorted mathematical expectation of e6 is PS(H|T ) = 0.583.
This estimate is consistent with previous experimental findings on the magnitude of first-order
alternation bias (Budescu, 1987; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Kareev, 1995).
The null hypothesis under Reduction is that there is no difference within subjects between
the reduced-form lottery CE and the compound-form lottery CE. The Wilcoxon signed-rank
test rejects the null that the median of the paired differences is zero (Asymptotic Wilcoxon-
Signed-Rank Test Z = 4.8017, p-value = 1.574 × 10−06). The distribution of within-subject
differences is negatively skewed.23 For robustness to skewness we also implement the paired sign
test, and find that the null of zero median difference is rejected (Dependent-samples Sign-Test
S = 42, p-value = 2.458×10−08). Furthermore, the comparison of the empirical Cumulative Dis-
tribution Functions (CDFs) reveals a stochastic dominance relationship: among those subjects
who reported a finite Certainty Equivalent within the task (N= 59), the reduced-form (Urn)
First-Order Stochastically Dominates the compound-form (Coin); among all subjects including
23D’Agostino skewness test γ1 = −1.9636, z = −3.2857, p-value = 0.001017
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those reporting a non-finite Certainty Equivalent in the task (N= 63), the reduced-form (Urn)
Second-Order Stochastically Dominates the compound-form (Coin).
Figure 1: Empirical CDFs of the Certainty Equivalents of the reduced-form StPG(6) (U64, red
solid line) and the compound-form StPG(6) (CT6, blue dotted line).





















The purpose of this experiment is to generate data that is suitable for implementing weak-form
and strong-form tests of Reduction. In a direct choice task between probabilistically equivalent
reduced-form and compound-form StPGs, any revealed bias for the reduced-form StPG only
constitutes a weak-form violation, due to the very strong assumptions involved. Therefore we
add direct choice tasks in which subjects must forgo a sure payoff in order to violate Reduction.
We term the latter strong-form violations of Reduction.
7.1 subjects and procedures
The procedural aspects of the experiment, the subject pool, the method of recruitment, the
laboratory, and the incentive scheme (RLI) are identical to Experiment I above. A total of 40
subjects participated in Experiment II. All subjects answered the 11 multiple-price list questions
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(Table 1: j=5,△=1), presented one at a time on the z-Tree display, for both the k=2 truncated
StPG(2) as well as the k = 6 truncated StPG(6). To control for ‘position effects’ (Bernasconi
and Loomes, 1992), the Urn option was presented on the left-hand side of the screen for half
of the subjects (N=20) and on the right-hand side for the other half (N=20). Within each of
these groups, half (N=10) received the StPG(2) questions before the StPG(6) questions, while
the remaining half (N=10) received the StPG(6) questions before the StPG(2) questions. At
the end of the experiment, a single question was randomly selected (out of the 22 questions) for
each individual, to be ‘played out and payed out’ for real money (RLI mechanism). Unlike the
experiments of Bar-Hillel (1973) and Budescu and Fischer (2001), the subject is not personally
involved in the selection and implementation of his/her real-money gamble. This is done to
ensure that choice is not influenced by illusion of control, fun, excitement or other components
of utility directly associated with participation in the process of gambling.
7.2 Results
Table 4: Proportion of subjects (of N=40) choosing the urn with the associated 95% confidence
intervals (Jeffreys prior) for the ‘max 2 tosses’ StPG(2) and ‘max 6 tosses’ StPG(6) price lists.
Urn Urn Urn Urn Urn Urn Coin Coin Coin Coin Coin
+5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
StPG(2) 1 1 1 1 1 .95 .25 .10 0 0 0
(95% CI) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.85,.99) (.14, .40) (.03, .22) (0,.06) (0,.06) (0,.06)
StPG(6) 1 1 1 1 1 .90 .475 .175 0 0 .025
(95% CI) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.78,.97) (.33,.63) (.08,.31) (0,.06) (0,.06) (.003,.11)
The Urn+0 entries may be tested for weak-form violation of Reduction (H0 : pˆ = p0 and
H1 : pˆ > p0) using the Exact Binomial Test with N = 40 and p0 = 0.5. On the StPG(2)
task, under the null hypothesis, the probability of observing pˆ ≥ .95 is 7.467 × 10−10. On the
StPG(6) task, under the null hypothesis, the probability of observing pˆ ≥ .90 is 9.285 × 10−08.
So under the Binomial test’s assumption that the Urn-choice probability is homogeneous within
task tested, the null hypothesis of ‘symmetrical choice probability’ is rejected. Thus the data
display weak-form violation of Reduction.
There is strong asymmetry to the left and right of the costless choice item (Urn+0). On
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the left-hand side of Table 4, note that all bonus sums – including e1 – are recognized as pure
windfall when they are combined with the Urn. All subjects elect to collect this windfall by
systematically choosing bonus-augmented Urn options over the Coin. We infer that δ < 1 and
that dominance is satisfied. Hence entries on the right-hand-side of the table reflect strong-form
violation of Reduction. In StPG(6), 47.5% of subjects forgo a sure bonus of e1 in order to obtain
Urn (reduced form) instead of the Coin (compound form). In StPG(2), 25% of subjects forgo
e1 in order to obtain the Urn. So with the △ = 1 increment, 25% of subjects display strong-
form violation of reduction on StPG(2) and 47.5% of subjects display strong-form violation of
Reduction on StPG(6).
8 Experiment III
This experiment is designed to test the robustness of Experiment II’s results by changing the
increment size to △ = 0.20 Euro and hence the range of the choice list to 2j△ = e2.
8.1 subjects and procedures
To ensure comparability, Experiment III is identical to Experiment II in terms of procedures,
method of recruitment, and incentive scheme (RLI). However Experiment III was conducted at
the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory (MaXLab) at the Faculty of Economics and Manage-
ment of Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg. Using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), we recruited
40 subjects who were enrolled in an engineering or computer science degree program at the
time of participating in the study, ensuring comparability of the subjects’ training in probability
theory with those of Experiments I and II. The subjects ranged in age from 19 to 23, with an
average of 22.5 years; 48% were male.
8.2 Results
Here, with restricted increment and range, all subjects choose the Urn when choice is costless
(i.e. in the Urn+0 column of Table 5). This is more extreme than in Experiment II, and the
null hypothesis of symmetrical choice probabilities is rejected (Exact Binomial Test one-sided
p-value = 9.095 × 10−13). Hence weak-form rejection of Reduction proves robust to increment
and range manipulation.
As in Experiment II, here there is again strong asymmetry to the left and right of the costless
choice item (Urn+0) of Table 5. From the left-hand side of the table we infer that δ < 0.20 and
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Table 5: Proportion of subjects (of N=40) choosing the urn with the associated 95% confidence
intervals (Jeffreys prior) for the ‘max 2 tosses’ StPG(2) and ‘max 6 tosses’ StPG(6) price lists.
Urn Urn Urn Urn Urn Urn Coin Coin Coin Coin Coin
+1 +.80 +.60 +.40 +.20 +0 +.20 +.40 +.60 +.80 +1
StPG(2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 .70 .525 .35 .275 .20
(95% CI) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.55, .82) (.37,.67) (.22,.50) (.16,.43) (.10,.34)
StPG(6) 1 1 1 1 1 1 .875 .75 .65 .575 .50
(95% CI) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.94,1) (.75,.95) (.60,.86) (.50,.78) (.42,.72) (.35,.65)
that dominance is satisfied. Hence entries on the right-hand-side of the table reflect strong-form
violation of Reduction. To be consistent with Reduction, the Urn-choice fractions should be zero
on the right-hand side of Table 5. Instead, 70% of subjects in the StPG(2) task and 87.5% of
subjects in the StPG(6) task forgo a sure bonus of 20 Euro cents in order to obtain the reduced
form instead of the compound form.
9 Further analysis of alternation bias
The above test results are consistent with the predictions of alternation bias. The structure of
Experiments II and III allow further direct tests of whether alternation bias is the sole driver of
the weak- and strong-form violation of Reduction documented here.
Take the Urn+0 and Coin+1 columns of Tables 4 and 5. The StPG(2) Urn-choice fraction
in the Urn+0 column under the △ = 1 increment (Table 4) should – if there are no other
drivers of choice – be equal to the Urn-choice fraction in the Urn+0 column under the △ = 0.20
increment (Table 5). Similarly for StPG(6) in the Urn+0 columns across the two tables as well
as for StPG(2) and StPG(6) in the Urn+1 columns across the two tables, giving a total of four
subtables.
With the restricted increment and range of Experiment III, all subjects choose the Urn in
both the StPG(2) and StPG(6) tasks when choice is costless (in the Urn+0 column of Table
5). The zero count in the Coin cell of the tabular presentation of these data causes problems
for standard Chi-squared tests and logistic regression. These problems may be overcome by
making recourse to exact tests. Fisher’s Exact Test is commonly applied in these circumstances.
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Here, the null hypothesis of no association between increment size (△ = 1 or △ = 0.20) and
Urn-choice propensity fails to be rejected in each of the four subtables when using Fisher’s Exact
Test.24 However, these four tests have very low power. In fact Fisher’s ET is known to have
low power in 2×2 tables (Lydersen et al., 2009). Being a conditional test, this test assumes that
both margins of the 2×2 table are fixed. So not only does Fisher’s ET have low power, but it
is premised on an assumption that is inconsistent with the structure of our experiments, where
the number of subjects in each increment-size condition is fixed by the experimenter, but the
Urn/Coin choice margin is not fixed. Unconditional tests such as Barnard’s ET and Boschloo’s
ET do not fix both margins, and consequently achieve higher power. Across the present four
subtables, Barnard’s ET achieves uniformly higher power than Boschloo’s ET. We report the
former.
Table 6: Barnard’s unconditional Exact Test of association between increment size and Urn-
choice propensity: p-values (one-sided), associated power, and adjusted pBH-values in which the
overall False Discovery Rate is controlled with the Benjamini-Hochberg method.
Urn Coin Barnard’s ET FDR
count count p-value power pBH-value
StPG(2)
△ = 1 38 2
0.103 0.32 0.206
Urn+0
△ = .20 40 0
StPG(6)
△ = 1 36 4
0.021 0.78 0.084
△ = .20 40 0
StPG(2)
△ = 1 10 30
0.340 0.12 0.453
Coin+1
△ = .20 8 32
StPG(6)
△ = 1 19 21
0.456 0.067 0.456
△ = .20 20 20
Even with Barnard’s ET, the achieved power is very low in the Coin+1 subtables. It is
24Using Fisher’s Exact Test, we find no significant association between the Urn-choosing fraction and increment
size in comparing (a.i) the Urn-choosing fraction from the StPG(2) row of the Urn+0 column of Table 4 ( 38
38+2
=
0.95) with that appearing in the corresponding cell of Table 5 ( 40
40+0
= 1) (p=0.494 2-sided; p=0.247 1-sided),
(a.ii) the Urn-choosing fraction from the StPG(6) row of the Urn+0 column of Table 4 ( 36
36+4
= 0.90) with that
appearing in the corresponding cell of Table 5 ( 40
40+0
= 1) (p= 0.116 2-sided; p= 0.058 1-sided), (b.i) the Urn-
choosing fraction from the StPG(2) row of the Coin+1 column of Table 4 ( 10
10+30
= 0.25) with that appearing in
the corresponding cell of Table 5 ( 8
8+32
= 0.20) (p=0.790 2-sided; p=0.397 1-sided), and (b.ii) the Urn-choosing
fraction from the StPG(6) row of the Coin+1 column of Table 4 ( 19
19+21
= 0.48) with that appearing in the
corresponding cell of Table 5 ( 20
20+20
= 0.50) (p=1.000 2-sided; p=0.500 1-sided).
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better in the Urn+0 subtables, achieving a level of .78 in the StPG(6) subtable, where the
null hypothesis is rejected with a p-value of 0.021. This result is suggestive of there being an
increment-size effect on Urn-choice propensity for α = 0.05. But adjusting the critical value to
control the Family-Wise Error Rate of the four simultaneous tests using Bonferroni’s correction
αB = 0.05/4 = 0.0125 or the more powerful Dunn-Sˇida´k correction αDS = 1− (1−α)1/4 = 0.0127
suggests that the null of ‘no association’ is not rejected in even one of the tests. Similarly, when
employing the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure for adjusting the p-values to control
the False Discovery Rate across the four simultaneous hypothesis tests, the null hypothesis again
remains unrejected.
The results of Bayesian analysis are more conclusive. Starting from uniformly distributed pri-
ors on Urn-choice propensity p(θe1)=p(θe.2)= Beta(1,1) and the null hypothesis of no difference
in these propensities H0 : θe1 − θe.2 = 0, H1 : θe1 − θe.2 6= 0, the Bayes factor BF01 =
P (D|H0)
P (D|H1













. In the Urn+0 StPG(2) subtable, where
n1=n2=40, s1=38 and s2=40, the Bayes factor is BF01=5.1. In the Urn+0 StPG(6) subtable
BF01 = 1.2, while for the Coin+1 subtables, the Bayes factor is BF01 = 3.8 for StPG(2) and
BF01=3.6 for StPG(6). Three of these Bayes factors fall in the range 3 < BF ≤ 10, indicating
that these subtables offer substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis of there being no
increment-size effect (Jeffreys, 1961).
Table 4 also contains information on the heterogeneity of alternation bias in the sample. We
may calculate the alternation bias required to rationalize the entries in Table 4, separately for
StPG(2) and StPG(6).
Let us take StPG(6) first. The 17.5% of subjects who forgo e2 in favor of the Urn satisfy
the inequality EfoS (StPG(6))+2 ≤ E(StPG(6)) + δ. From this and the fact that none of these
17.5% of subjects is willing to forgo e3 in order to obtain the Urn, the first-order alternation
bias for this 17.5% of the subjects may be calculated as PS(H|T ) ∈ [0.583, 0.646) for those
subjects with δ = 0 and PS(H|T ) ∈ [0.537, 0.583) for those subjects with δ arbitrarily close to
1. Similarly, the 47.5% who forgo e1 (but not e2) in favor of the Urn satisfy the inequality
EfoS (StPG(6))+1 ≤ E(StPG(6)) + δ and their first-order alternation bias may be calculated as
PS(H|T ) ∈ [0.537, 0.583) for those subjects with δ = 0 and PS(H|T ) ∈ [0.5, 0.537) for those
subjects with δ arbitrarily close to 1. Overall, these alternation bias estimates are consistent
with Experiment I as well as with existing literature (Budescu, 1987; Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar,
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1991; Kareev, 1995).
However, StPG(2) throws up an inconsistency. Choosing to forgo e1 in order have the Urn
StPG(2) instead of the Coin StPG(2) requires an alternation bias of PS(H|T ) = 1 for those
subjects with δ = 0 and PS(H|T ) ∈ [0.5, 1) for those subjects with δ arbitrarily close to 1.
Note that alternation bias of PS(H|T ) = 1 falls outside the empirical range established in the
existing literature, where PS(H|T ) has been found to reside in the neighborhood of 0.6. However,
choosing to forgo e2 in order to have the Urn StPg(2) instead of the Coin StPG(2) – as is done
by 10% of the subjects in Table 4 – cannot be rationalized by any degree of alternation bias
PS(H|T ) ∈ [0, 1] for subjects with δ ∈ [0, 1). This is because, even with the maximum alternation
bias of PS(H|T ) = 1, the subjectively distorted expectation of the Coin-implemented StPG(2)
is EfoS (StPG(2)) = 3 (see Figure 2), from which follows that E
fo
S (StPG(2))+2 > E(StPG(2)) +
δ for δ ∈ [0, 1).25
Figure 2: Implications of subjective distortion of conditional probability on subjective expected

















For StPG(6), the implied alternation bias ranges are consistent with existing empirical esti-
mates and these ranges successfully rationalize the departures from Reduction in Table 4. How-
ever for StPG(2), alternation bias is insufficient, on its own, to rationalize all departures from
25where the range for δ is implied by the unanimous choice of the Urn in the Urn+1 items on the left-hand side
of Table 4
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Reduction in Table 4. Instead, the observed within-subjects pattern across Coin+2 StPG(2)
and Coin+2 StPG(6) implies a model of the form
EfoSi (StPG(2)) + 2 ≤ E(StPG(2)) + δi +Φi , (9.1)
where Φi reflects the monetary value of the strength of preference difference between the Urn
and the Coin that subject i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} does not attribute to PSi(H|T ) or δi. This can be
understood in terms of source dependence. Whereas the source dependence studied by Tversky
and Wakker (1995) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) operates via the probability weighting func-
tion, here it is clear from the within-subjects contrast between Coin+2 StPG(2) and Coin+2
StPG(6) that the effect driving the Urn-choice fraction in Coin+2 StPG(2) is independent of the
probability weighting function, else the Urn-choice fraction in Coin+3 StPG(6) would be biased
upward above the level observed in Table 4. On the other hand, the source dependence pro-
posed by Smith (1969) and estimated econometrically by Harrison et al. (2012) operates via the
utility function: individuals are permitted to have different utility functions specific to different
random processes (randomization devices). This form of source dependence is consistent with
the choice pattern in Coin+2 StPG(2), Coin+2 StPG(6) and Coin+3 StPG(6). Disentangling
and quantifying the behavioral effects aggregated within Φi – including e.g. of preference for
simplicity over complexity, of preference for few levels of compounding over many levels of com-
pounding, and of preference for simultaneous resolution of uncertainty over sequential resolution
of uncertainty – requires lottery manipulations that shift the focus away from truncated StPGs,
and is left for future investigation.
10 Discussion
Recognition that alternation bias is empirically operative in StPGs creates an alternative to
the radical reparameterization of CPT suggested by Blavatskyy (2005).26 Prospect Theory, and
by extension CPT, was conceived to be a descriptive workhorse model to account for a central
subset of decision-making biases and heuristics, while abstracting from all those remaining.27
Original Prospect Theory is explicitly limited to ‘simple prospects’, i.e. reduced-form prospects,
and therefore makes no claims to capture the behavioral implications of StPG-defining com-
poundness. Meanwhile, only one parametrization of one particular CPT probability weighting
26Similarly, it suggests that Pfiffelmann’s (2011) calibrated restriction of the shape of the probability weighting
function may be re-implemented under alternation bias.
27“Theories of choice are at best approximate and incomplete” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 317).
22
function satisfies the simplest probabilistic reduction of compound gambles condition.28 Using
this power function specification of the probability weighting function, Blavatskyy (2005) shows
that the CPT value of StPGs is infinite. Augmenting CPT to incorporate subjective distortion
of conditional probability in binary sequence compound prospects – as the present experiments
suggest is required in a descriptive theory – renders the otherwise conventionally parameterized
CPT valuation finite, falling within the accepted empirical range (Kaivanto, 2008).
Methodologically, the present study extends and complements existing experimental tests of
Reduction, the principal features of which are summarized in Table 7. Although the experimental
designs employed in these studies display variety and heterogeneity, they are also characterized
by similarities and regularities. For instance, six of the studies employ 2-Alternative Forced
Choice (2AFC) tasks, one employs 3-Alternative Forced Choice (3AFC) tasks, and one elicits
lottery reservation prices with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method. None of the eight
studies has a design that demonstrably satisfies the dominance precept. Incentives range from
nothing (hypothetical choice tasks) to e100 ≈ US$136, some paying out 1-in-1 while others pay
out according to an RLI mechanism, but not one of these studies is able to demonstrate that
the payoff function being employed compensates for δi, the monetary value of the psychological
cost of supplying the null hypothesis response in place of the alternative hypothesis response.
In part, this is due to designs which do not accommodate and reflect possible heterogeneity in
the latent δi parameter. The development and in-use demonstration of just such an instrument
is one of the key undertakings of the present work.
28When Prelec’s two-parameter family W (p) = [−β(− ln p)α] is specialized to W (p) = pβ by setting α = 1,
then ((x, p), q) ∼ (x, pq), as shown by Luce (2001).
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Table 7: Summary of existing experiments’ design parameters




















































































































2Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
3Keller (1985)
4Bernasconi and Loomes (1992)
5Budescu and Fischer (2001)
6Halevy (2007)
7Kaivanto and Kroll (2012)
8Harrison et al. (2012)
9simple vs. compound, simple vs. actuarially equivalent, compound vs. actuarially equivalent
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Bar-Hillel (1973), Budescu and Fischer (2001) and Kaivanto and Kroll (2012) implement
incentivized weak-form tests of Reduction (H0 : pˆ = 0.5), with the latter supplying a non-trivial
monetary incentive both in nominal terms as well as in expectation. Bernasconi and Loomes
(1992) implement hypothetical 3AFC tasks, and thus the null hypothesis of their weak-form
tests29 are of the form H0 : pˆ =
1
3 . Altogether half of the existing studies (four in total) imple-
ment weak-form tests of Reduction.30 Bar-Hillel’s (1973) rejections of Reduction are psycholog-
ically inclusive, in the sense of not controlling for the effects of miscalculation of probabilities,
illusion of control, fun, excitement or other components of utility directly associated with par-
ticipation in the process of gambling (that is, the ‘utility of gambling’ deriving from, e.g., rolling
the dice, picking marbles from an urn, or choosing a card). Budescu and Fischer (2001) ask their
subjects to record the reasons for their choices; these reported reasons reflect the psychological
inclusivity of the design and implementation. The most frequently given reasons were: sample
space size (ratio bias), number of events (fewer being preferred), stress (of sequential compound
events), simplicity (being preferred), hope, fun (of there being ‘more action’), illusion of control,
and time (preferring an immediate answer). Meanwhile, the Kaivanto and Kroll (2012) exper-
iments were implemented with laboratory procedures designed (i) to attenuate and suppress
the experience of gambling and the possibility for illusion of control, as well as (ii) to mitigate
presentation format regularities that manifest as response bias attributable to ‘secondary crite-
ria’, while explicitly controlling for ratio bias (sample space effects) and miscalculation-induced
response bias.31
In the modern experimental economics sense, weak-form violations of Reduction fall short
of meaningful and valid rejections of Reduction. The EU values of a compound lottery and its
reduced form are identical, and since any choice pattern between these two lotteries is consistent
with identical EU values, 2AFC tasks cannot offer evidence against Reduction. To resolve
this methodological dilemma, experiments II and III follow Chernoff (1954), Savage (1954),
Bernasconi and Loomes (1992), Mandler (2005) and Danan (2008) in utilizing a small monetary
‘bonus’ to deform the indifference relation into a strict preference relation, and furthermore
present the subject with a multiple-price list of such bonus-augmented 2AFC tasks such that
heterogeneity in δi may be revealed and conformity with the dominance precept may be directly
29n.b. the ‘swap option’ that Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) include provides additional information beyond
the weak-form test
30Harrison et al. (2012) also implement weak-form tests of Reduction using the binomial test on 10 different
2AFC tasks separately.
31The laboratory procedures in Experiments I–III are also designed to achieve control in these dimensions.
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observed if the choice of reduced form over its compound equivalent is not merely a manifestation
of the failure to satisfy dominance.
As a conceptual matter however, we may ask whether a set of assumptions exists from
which the symmetric choice frequency null hypothesis follows. Modern experimental economics
tests theories in conjunction with a set of auxiliary hypotheses first set out by Vernon Smith
(1969). In the absence of these auxiliary hypotheses – making recourse solely to the axioms
of EU – it is nevertheless not the case that EU places no restrictions whatsoever on what
lottery attributes the decision maker may consult in making choices. Rather, as quotations from
Paul Samuelson and Peter Fishburn above make plain, the only parameters consulted by EU
decision makers are outcomes and reduced-form probabilities. This rules out systematic non-
symmetrical response distributions in 2AFC tasks between lotteries with identical EU values
such as compound lotteries and their reduced-form equivalents. In the eyes of a strictly EU
decision maker, there simply are no distinguishing features between compound- and reduced-
form lottery pairs, and this prevents systematically biased choice patterns from being formed.
As noted above, this is a very strict theoretical interpretation of EU, and accordingly we suggest
that symmetric choice frequency null hypotheses be labeled weak-form tests.
Those acquainted with the precepts of modern experimental economics rightly point to ‘sec-
ondary criteria’ and absence of dominance as potential causes of asymmetric response patterns
in such weak-form tests. Hence it is a matter for the consumer of the weak-form test result
to evaluate (i) whether sufficient precautions against secondary criteria have been taken, and
(ii) whether the incentives offered satisfy the dominance precept. The three studies cited above
illustrate the difference that (i) and (ii) can make. The Bar-Hillel (1973) experiments, which are
implemented with weak incentives and direct subject involvement in ‘playing out’ the lotteries
– hence likely to give rise to the illusion of control, fun, excitement, and utility from the process
of gambling itself – find that subjects prefer compound lotteries over reduced-form lotteries.
This result, which is known in the literature as an example of the overweighting of conjunctive
probabilities, is precisely the opposite of what Budescu and Fischer (2001) and Kaivanto and
Kroll (2012) find with experimental designs more attuned to (i) controlling secondary criteria
and (ii) offering strong incentives.
Three studies – Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Keller (1985) and Harrison et al. (2012)
– employ tests that substitute the strict interpretation of EU’s axioms with a requirement
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for across-task consistency (or homogeneity) in choice propensity. This is the configuration
employed in the classical preference reversal experiments, which remain agnostic with regard to
what constitutes the normative choice propensity in any one task individually. Instead, formal
statistical testing is used to determine whether choice propensity changes across the 2AFC pair
as a result of each having a different presentation format (one including a compound-form lottery,
the other including the equivalent reduced-form lottery).
Halevy (2007) employs a valuation-based design, specifically the elicitation of reservation
prices through the BDM mechanism. He tests whether the four repeated measures (distributions
of reservation prices) are drawn from the same parent distribution, using the Friedman test. As
in Experiment I of this paper (Section 6) Halevy (2007) finds that the reduced-form lottery
attracts a higher valuation than compound-form lotteries. Moreover, Halevy (2007) shows that
this difference in valuation survives a robustness treatment condition in which the monetary
stakes are increased by a factor of 10, the task order is varied, subjects’ comprehension of the
BDM mechanism is reinforced, the question wording is varied, and the efficiency of the sampling
method is increased.
Finally, Harrison et al. (2012) estimate structural econometric models in which the value
and probability weighting functions are specified with parametric forms that admit depen-
dence on the compound lottery form, i.e. source dependence. Vuong and Clarke tests are
used to select the best-fitting model (between EU and RDU), and then within the best-fitting
model (RDU) structural tests of Reduction are implemented by testing the H0 : rˆcˆ = 0 in
U(x|compound lottery) = x(1−r−rc)/(1−r−rc) and H0 : γˆcˆ = 0 in ω(p|compound lottery) =
pγ+γc. The authors do not find evidence of source dependence in the 1-in-1 incentive condition,
but do find evidence of source dependence (Reduction violation) in the 1-in-40 RLI condition.
Furthermore, they note that the inference would be reversed – i.e. source dependence (Reduc-
tion violation) in the 1-in-1 condition and no source dependence in the 1-in-40 condition – if one
were to erroneously assume EU instead of RDU.
Ultimately, it would be desirable to test for alternation bias and Reduction within a struc-
tural econometric modeling framework. In its present state of development however, where a
parametrically convenient linear specification reflects the state of the art, it is not clear how dis-
tortions of conditional probability (i.e. alternation bias) should be incorporated.32 At the same
32As Harrison et al.’s (2012) lotteries are restricted to a maximum of one level of compounding, their estimates of
probability weighting function source dependence simultaneously impound both unconditional probability weight-
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time, it is not yet clear how to design the tasks required for structural econometric modeling
in such a way as to capture or accommodate heterogeneity in δi. The trade-off struck in the
design of Experiments I–III favors alternation bias based hypotheses and direct revelation of
δi over parametric statistical modeling. Yet as elaborated in Section 9, results obtained within
this framework reinforce Harrison et al.’s (2012) structural econometric finding that the utility
function is source dependent in the manner first conjectured by Smith (1969). With careful in-
terpretation, these different methodological approaches prove to be complementary rather than
rival.
11 Conclusion
Together Experiments I–III cast doubt on the descriptive validity of Reduction in StPGs. Since
Reduction is an axiom that is necessary for EU and especially its application to StPGs, the
weak- and strong-form violations uncovered here also impinge upon EU’s status as a wholly
satisfactory resolution of the St. Petersburg Paradox.
The direction of the present empirical findings is consistent with the operation of alternation
bias, which is a subjective distortion of conditional probability, distinct from the major avenues
to resolving the St. Petersburg Paradox pursued thus far: outcome distortion (concave utility for
money) and probability distortion (unconditional probability weighting). Nevertheless, we also
find that alternation bias is not the sole explanator of the preference for reduced-form StPGs
over compound-form StPGs. This points to a requirement for experimental designs that can
accommodate more elaborate source dependence structures than those contemplated thus far.
The present methodology complements recent advances by Halevy (2007) and Harrison et al.
(2012). To our knowledge, the multiple-price list utilized here is the first instrument to facilitate
revelation of heterogeneity in δi and to enable the bounding of these latent δi. Consequently, it
allows direct demonstration of conformity with Smith’s (1969) dominance precept.
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